The Future of Genocide: A Spectacle for the New Millenium? by Smolin, David M.
Fordham International Law Journal
Volume 23, Issue 2 1999 Article 11
The Future of Genocide: A Spectacle for the
New Millenium?
David M. Smolin∗
∗
Copyright c©1999 by the authors. Fordham International Law Journal is produced by The Berke-
ley Electronic Press (bepress). http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ilj
The Future of Genocide: A Spectacle for the
New Millenium?
David M. Smolin
Abstract
The lines between bearing witness and producing entertainment, between genuine outrage and
self-righteous apathy can be initially difficult to discern. Such differences lie in the difficult areas
of ethics, religion, and the hidden recesses of the human heart. Nonetheless, over thousands of
years various world religions have sought to come to terms with the deepest questions pertaining to
intention, action, and ethics, and particularly with the manner in which human beings are trained in
ways of life or death. This Essay shall include some specifically Christian theological perspectives
on the dilemmas that draw us toward the specter of genocide as spectacle.
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INTRODUCTION
Anti-utopian novels are helpful because they critique cer-
tain features of our present and warn us of what our future could
become. Given the human condition, we must remain ever
aware of the ways in which we are most apt to fall, in the hope of
avoiding moral catastrophe. In the spirit of such a novel-but
without the entertainment value-this Essay plots the trajectory
that could bring us to a future in which genocide becomes a
spectacle, an event that is presented to the world as an unusually
compelling form of entertainment.
The lines between bearing witness and producing entertain-
ment, between genuine outrage and self-righteous apathy can be
initially difficult to discern. Such differences lie in the difficult
areas of ethics, religion, and the hidden recesses of the human
heart. Nonetheless, over thousands of years various world reli-
gions have sought to come to terms with the deepest questions
pertaining to intention, action, and ethics, and particularly with
the manner in which human beings are trained in ways of life or
death. This Essay shall include some specifically Christian theo-
logical perspectives on the dilemmas that draw us toward the
specter of genocide as spectacle.
I. BYSTANDERS AS SPECTATORS: GENOCIDE AND THE
MORAL EDUCATION OF HUMANKIND
A bystander is an interesting and somewhat paradoxical fig-
ure in moral, legal, and religious discourse. The bystander ob-
serves some wrong, crime, or sin. This act of observing, which
may appear passive and insignificant in itself, is in fact the gate-
way to a profound testing of the human person. If the bystander
chooses to intervene and assist the victim, then he or she can
become a rescuer, an examplar of neighbor love. If the by-
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stander intentionally renders even slight assistance to the perpe-
trator, then he or she becomes an accomplice in crime, and pos-
sibly equally liable for the evil done by others. The bystander
who misinterprets the situation and mistakenly assists the aggres-
sor, or who bungles the rescue and leaves matters worse than
before, may be termed a meddler, and resented despite the best
of intentions. The common response of simply turning away, or
walking on the "other side of the road" in Jesus' parable of the
Good Samaritan, is in Christian terms a violation of the law of
love, even if in some legal systems there is no liability.'
Much has been written about the failure of bystanders in
the Holocaust. The tendency of human beings to turn away
from grave human suffering and do nothing has been la-
mented.2 The abandonment of the Jews by allied governments
during World War II has been criticized.' We have worried
about the propensity of human beings to remain passive in the
face of extreme evil and suffering.
Currently, bystanders are often tuning in rather than turn-
ing away. Instead of worrying about what happens to human be-
ings who deliberately turn away from evil and suffering, we now
must be concerned with what happens to human beings who de-
liberately choose to observe such suffering.
Those who view a significant crime are, of course, witnesses.
Witnessing a crime has a moral significance that brings with it a
corollary set of obligations, such as the duty to affirmatively give
testimony (i.e., bear witness), the duty to the truth, the duty to
the deceased victims, and the duty to warn others.4 Bystanders
who turn in by electronic media will have no such duties, be-
1. See, e.g, DAVID P. GUSHEE, THE RIGHTEOUS GENTILES OF THE HOLOCAUST (1994)
(analyzing ethical and religious ramifications of rescuers, bystanders, and accomplices
during Holocaust); WAYNE R. LAFAvE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR., CRIMINAL LAW 203-12,
463-65, 569-71 (2d. ed. 1986) (discussing limits of bystander criminal liability, errone-
ous defense of another, and accomplice liability); W. PAGE KEETON, PROSSER & KEETON
ON THE LAW OF TORTS 358-59, 375-85 (5th ed. 1984) (explaining tort law discussion of
duty, limits of bystander liability, and liability for bungled interventions). According to
Professor Ben Zion Eliash, traditional Jewish Law has a broad view of duty that requires
bystanders to act to preserve human life. See Ben Zion Eliash, To Leave or Not To Leave:
The Good Samaritan in Jewish Law, 38 ST. Louis U. L.J. 619 (1994).
2. See, e.g., GUSHEEE, supra note 1.
3. See, e.g., DAVID S. WYMAN, THE ABANDONMENT OF THE JEWS (1984); MONTY NoAM
PENKOWER, THE JEWS WERE EXPENDABLE (1983).
4. See, e.g., MARTIN GILBERT, THE HOLOCAUST 252-79 (1985) (recording exper-
iences of Polish Jewish witness of January 1942 mass murder).
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cause electronic technology will itself provide a clear and true
record of the event. Electronic bystanders will thus become, po-
tentially at least, mere spectators. And genocides, particularly
where they are broadcast more or less contemporaneously with
the event, could become spectacles.
The line in the West between being informed and being en-
tertained is already quite thin, for news itself has become, as an
industry, closely allied with the entertainment business. The
global integration of mass media enterprises has left the news
industry controlled by the same mega-corporations involved in
various forms of entertainment, such as movies and popular mu-
sic.5 Both sides of the thinly-separated news-entertainment line
cover genocide as a subject matter, with the news industry pro-
viding coverage of unfolding events in, for example, the former
Yugoslavia, while the entertainment industry produces movies
such as "Schindler's List."
Most recently those who perpetrate mass killings and geno-
cides have tried, with mixed success, to keep their work under-
cover. The removal of reporters from the scene is a common
precursor to brutality. These efforts to prevent media coverage
are often only partially successful, and thus there is often some
media coverage of at least the immediate results of large-scale
atrocities. One can foresee that with the continuing advance of
electronic technology there will come a time when live video-
communications will be as ubiquitous as audio technologies (i.e.,
telephones and cellular phones) have already become. There
will come a day, in other words, when it will be virtually impossi-
ble to prevent contemporaneous images of genocide from
emerging into global consciousness, just as the Chinese were un-
able to prevent the world from watching as their tanks rolled
over demonstrators in Tiananmen Square.
We watch the bystander in Holocaust films, usually with dis-
dain. How could they have turned away, and done nothing? But
what does it mean when by watching we ourselves become the
bystanders, for the unfolding horrors are yet in progress? Tech-
nological advances in transportation and in military capability
make it increasingly obvious that we-or more important our
5. See Ilene Knable Gotts, Financing, Mergers & Acquisitions in the Telecommunications
Industry, 1014 PRAc. L. INST. 55, 64-67 (Sept. 1997) (noting Disney's acquisition of Capi-
tal Cities/ABC and Time Warner's buyout of Turner Broadcasting).
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Western, powerfully armed nations-could, if they so choose, in-
tervene forcefully anywhere in the world. Our bystander guilt
thus becomes, to the degree that our nations do not act, corpo-
rate and national. Whole nations and civilizations become by-
stander nations and civilizations.6
It is well-known that rescuers faced enormous risks during
the Holocaust. Bystanders could only become rescuers by violat-
ing the rules of the reigning political and military authorities,
and risking becoming, along with their families and loved ones,
victims of the same fate as those they would seek to rescue.7 Yet,
how often and how easily are such bystanders criticized for their
failures to act, and for their propensity to turn away? How then
can we defend ourselves as individuals from bystander guilt
when we tune in and then turn away without making any effort,
from the safety of our home countries, to urge the responsible
authorities to intervene?
There is still today, a half-century later, broad criticism of
the failure of the Allied Powers to act militarily against the Holo-
caust, and thereby attempt, for example through the bombing of
railway lines or the camps themselves, to save lives.' This strate-
gic decision was made within the context of the moral necessity
of maximizing efforts toward the defeat of the Axis Powers.9
Without directly engaging the debate over whether this broader
6. Several authors have noted that modern media coverage of large-scale human
rights abuses often produces pressure to intervene. See Richard Falk, The Complexities of
Humanitarian Intervention: A New World Order Challenge, 17 MICH. J. INT'L LAw 491, 493
(1996) (stating that "heightened expectations about conformity to minimal human
rights standards generate interventionary pressures, especially given the capacity of tele-
vision and other innovative media to create real-time awareness of many types of inhu-
mane behavior on a global basis"); George Melloan, Kofi Annan's World View Is Not a
Model of Clarity, WALL ST. J., Oct. 5, 1999, at A27 (arguing that North Atlantic Treaty
Organization's ("NATO") intervention in Kosovo was probably influenced by television
images of refugees). The present Essay is intended to explore the consequences of our
frequent failure, as media bystanders, to act according to our expressed values. We
often, in other words, resist the "interventionary pressures" created by the combination
of our expressed values and media-created "real-time awareness" of gross atrocities. See
Falk, supra, at 505 (noting recent trend in United States toward the "avoidance of inter-
vention even in the face of extreme humanitarian emergencies.")
7. ANTHOLOGY OF HOLOCAUST LITERATURE 361, 367-8 (Jacob Glatstein et al. ed.,
1977) (noting that those who assisted victims were subject to death penalty).
8. See, e.g., WYMAN, supra note 3, x-xi (summarizing conclusions of author).
9. See, e.g., HENRY L. FEINGOLD, WHO SHALL BEAR GUILT FOR THE HOLOCAUST? THE
HUMAN DILEMMA IN GENOCIDE AND HUMAN RIGHTS 59-81 (Jack Nusan Porter ed., 1982);
MICHAEL R. MARRus, THE HOLOCAUST IN HISTORY 167 (1987).
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context to any degree explains or excuses the failures of the Al-
lied response to the Holocaust, we can nonetheless compare that
situation to our own. How much less weighty are our purported
reasons for failing to prevent the genocide in Rwanda! Are our
geo-political reasons for not intervening in the internal matter of
mass killings in Cambodia greater than those faced by the gener-
ation of the Holocaust? How favorably do our reasons for delay-
ing and severely limiting responses to the various ethnic cle-
ansings in the former Yugoslavia compare to those that influ-
enced the Allied powers? Why are we willing to place a hyper-
critical eye upon prior generations, while excusing our own gen-
eration's failures under far less difficult circumstances?' 0
The second half of the twentieth century has demonstrated
that the prevention of genocide, mass killing, and ethnic cleans-
ing is a secondary value in the post-Holocaust world community.
The comforts of inaction and the maintenance of relative
"peace," non-interference in the internal affairs of nations, and
geo-political alliances and balances of power rank substantially
higher in the operational values of the world community. We do
not like to admit the rank order of our values, but they are so
visibly displayed by our actions that it is difficult to come to any
other conclusion.
To admit that we are willing to put up with genocide in the
interest of comfort, peace, non-interference, and power calcula-
tions places us precisely in the position of the bystander individ-
uals and nations who, for varied self-interested reasons of their
own, decided not to act in the face of the Holocaust. It appears,
in other words, that we have not substantially advanced, in deeds
as opposed to words, in our attitudes toward the Holocaust.
In the meantime, however, we have elevated the Holocaust
itself to a seminal event of religious and moral significance. As
opposed to the relative silence that followed the Armenian geno-
cide, of which Hitler took note, we have spoken, and continue to
10. This Essay will not delineate and evaluate the varied levels of intervention and
response to recent mass killings or atrocities, such as those mentioned in the text. The
premise of the Essay, which seems to be widely shared, is that the international commu-
nity has frequently failed to prevent such crimes, even when there has been a significant
level of intervention, for example in Kosovo. Those interventions, which have oc-
curred, have generally been too little and too late to prevent large-scale loss of life. See,
e.g., Falk, supra note 6, at 500 (referring to "profound disillusionment with the capacity
of the collective will in international society to protect vulnerable peoples against severe
forms of abuse").
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speak, repeatedly about the Holocaust. This author, at least,
grew up with the overarching question, "what would you have
done if you had been alive then?" Once it becomes clear that we
will not act decisively to prevent the genocides of our own day, it
becomes reasonable to become cynical about ourselves.
The path of cynicism may lead to unexpected places. From
lamenting those who turn away, we may become those who tune
in, but remain similarly passive. Tuning into the genocides and
mass killings of the past and present can become an attempt to
escape from the duty of present action. Instead of acting, we
dutifully watch. We may call it witnessing, but instead we are
really spectators. Repeat the ritual enough-the watching of
holocaust movies, the watching of the unfolding of current
genocides on the television news, and then someday the real-
time video of the actual mass killings-and it may become a
form of entertainment. But will this visceral and intense viewing
really assuage us from the guilt of inaction? And will we at some
point make the subtle transformation toward actually enjoying
the atrocities? Like the Roman crowds of old, will we come to
admire a particularly brutal act, parsing its methods with the
practiced eye of one used to seeing others die? Will live geno-
cide coverage-and not just genocide movies-become an art
form, a way of evoking pathos and rage and other human emo-
tions, which while moving our emotions replace in us any need
for action and responsibility? Eventually, will genocide itself be-
come a virtual sport or art form, with the masses commenting
how one brutal act was particularly well-executed, another partic-
ularly pathetic?
In this context, the current propensity to create specialized
tribunals to punish perpetrators of genocide and crimes against
humanity can be viewed with cynicism, as reflected by a state-
ment by Payam Akhavan, Legal Advisor, Office of the Prosecu-
tor, International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia and
Rwanda:
It would be a grave error if we were to make a habit of being
spectators as a million people were being slaughtered.., only
to create the illusion that justice has been done through a
handful of prosecutions. Without an accompanying will to
prevent such tragedies or to intervene when they are un-
folding, it is difficult to view ad hoc courts as anything but a
1999]
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pretense of justice by the powerful."
II. FUNDAMENTAL HUMAN RIGHTS AD FUNDAMENTAL
PRINCIPLES OF OUR WORLD ORDER
The contradiction between maintaining peace through
non-interference with the internal affairs of sovereign nations,
and the contemporary notion of international human rights as
legally binding sovereign states regarding their treatment of in-
ternal populations, is most evident in instances of genocide or
other mass killings. The endless debates over the doctrine of
humanitarian intervention, which purports to permit interven-
tion into sovereign states in instances such as, genocide or mass
killings, suggest that we have not come to a generally-accepted
resolution of this fundamental contradiction. 2 Practically-
speaking, the international community in our time appears to
generally rank the principle of non-interference with the inter-
nal affairs of sovereign nations as superior in importance to the
protection of international human rights." Thus, the interna-
tional community will generally seek a way of redressing viola-
tions of fundamental human rights in a manner that will not
interfere with national sovereignty. In instances of genocide,
mass killings, or ethnic cleansing, this means that most often the
international community refuses to use military force within the
11. Proceedings of the 92nd Annual Meeting of the American Society of Interna-
tional Law, April 1-4, 1998, in Steven R. Ratner, The Genocide Convention After Fifty Years,
92 AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. PROC. 1, 13 (1998).
12. See, e.g., Melloan, supra note 6; Falk, supra note 6; Fernando R. Teson, Collective
Humanitarian Intervention, 17 MICH.J. INT'L LAw 323 (1996); Nikolai Krylov, Humanita-
rian Intervention: Pros and Cons, 17 Loy. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 365 (1995). A listing of
historical examples of interventions and non-interventions from the early 19th century
until 1991 can be found in David J. Scheffer, Toward a Modern Doctrine of Humanitarian
Intervention, 23 U. TOL. L. REv. 253, 293 n.4 (1992).
13. LEo KUPER, GENOCIDF 161 (1981). Leo Kuper makes this point provocatively:
The main thesis of this chapter is that the sovereign territorial state claims, as
an integral part of its sovereignty, the right to commit genocide, or engage in
genocidal massacres, against peoples under its rule, and that the United Na-
tions, for all practical purposes, defends this right. To be sure, no state explic-
itly claims the right to commit genocide .. . but the right is exercised under
other more acceptable rubrics .... And though the norm for the United
Nations is to sit by, and watch, like a grandstand spectator, the unfolding of
the genocidal conflict in the domestic arena right through to the final mas-
sacres, there would generally be concern, and action, to provide humanitarian
relief for the refugees, and direct intercession by the Secretary-General.
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sovereign territory of a perpetrator without the consent of the
perpetrator nation. The net result is that genocides and mass
killings are generally addressed after the fact, through, as noted
above, "a handful of prosecutions," rather than through effective
efforts to actually prevent or intervene to stop such acts.
The argument in favor of such a rank ordering of priorities
is that the principle of national sovereignty is the primary foun-
dation of peace in the contemporary world, without which the
world could potentially be bathed in a constant stream of blood.
Even the most worthy humanitarian interventions to stop geno-
cides or mass killings undercut national sovereignty and supply
cover for those invaders who might want to use alleged violations
of human rights as a cover for their own expansionist designs.
Concerns about the indirect costs of humanitarian interventions
are modest, however, compared to the direct dangers that would
be posed by attempting to intervene forcibly within powerful na-
tions, such as China, Russia, or the United States. Any attempt
to intervene within these larger nations, even if purportedly in
the interest of the most basic of human rights, would doubtless
be considered an invasion, and be treated accordingly. Indeed,
even the principle of national sovereignty itself appears to have
little meaning in instances where one of these larger nations acts
in an expansionist manner, or pursuant to its interests within its
own most immediate region. Thus, the world has had little
meaningful response to China's treatment of Tibet, or to U.S.
interventions within the Americas. In this sense, in the modern
international community the avoidance of large-scale war trumps
even the principle of national sovereignty. Larger powerful na-
tions are sometimes able, despite the principle of non-interfer-
ence in the U.N. Charter, 4 to prey upon, or intervene within,
their smaller, more vulnerable neighbors.' 5 The special status
and powers of larger nations are implicitly guaranteed by the
structure of the Security Council, including the veto power of
14. See Charter of the United Nations, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031, art. 2(4) [here-
inafter U.N. Charter].
15. Richard Falk's discussion of the "complexities of humanitarian intervention"
takes account of the special role of powerful nations in all kinds of interventions, in-
cluding humanitarian interventions. As Professor Falk notes, it is "virtually a definition
of ... a great power" to "project power and influence beyond territorial sovereignty,"
creating a geopolitical pressure to intervene in the affairs of weaker states. See Falk,
supra note 6, at 491.
1999]
468 FORDHAMINTERNATIONALLAWJOURNAL [Vol. 23:460
the five permanent members.16 Thus, the structure of the U.N.
Charter recognizes the privileged status of the most powerful na-
tions.
The principles of international human rights appear, there-
fore, to rank at least third in order of priority, behind the princi-
ples of state sovereignty and the special privileges of great pow-
ers. Such calculations could be defended religiously and ethi-
cally on prudential grounds. The point herein, however, is
neither to defend nor criticize such rank orderings, but rather to
examine the impact of our failure, due to this rank orderings of
values, to act to defend human life from genocide and mass kill-
ing. What are the implications, and effects, of knowingly and
purposely failing to protect human life from acts such as geno-
cide, mass killings, and ethnic cleansing?
III. PROTECTING HUMAN LIFE
The book of Proverbs in the Hebrew scriptures records this
contemplation on the duty to rescue:
Deliver those who are drawn toward death,
And hold back those stumbling to the slaughter.
If you say, 'Surely we did not know this,'
Does not He who weighs the heart consider it?
He who keeps your soul, does He not know it?
And will He not render to each man according to his
deeds?1
7
It seems fitting that this compelling admonition to rescue is pre-
ceded by this comment: "If you faint in the day of adversity,
Your strength is small.""8
The task of rescuing, of intervening to save those being un-
16. See U.N. Charter, supra note 14, at arts. 23-27.
17. Proverbs 24:11-12 (New KingJames).
18. Proverbs 24:10 (New King James). A modern Jewish translation intertwines
Proverbs 24:10-12 together into a single thought, as follows:
If you showed yourself slack in time of trouble,
Wanting in power,
If you refrained from rescuing those taken off to death,
Those condemned to slaughter-
If you say, "We knew nothing of it,"
Surely He who fathoms hearts will discern [the truth],
He who watches over your life will know it,
And He will pay each man as he deserves."
TANAKH 1324 (Jewish Publication Society 1988).
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justly slaughtered, is not for the faint-hearted. Yet, within the
tradition of Biblical religion, the admonition to rescue is not idi-
osyncratic, but rather is an organic part of the larger teaching
regarding the protection of innocent human life. The human
duty to protect human life is not limited to the negative com-
mandment not to murder, but instead has positive implications
for acting affirmatively in favor of human life. This duty extends
to the bystander.19
A well-known New Testament text on the duty of the by-
stander is Jesus' parable of the Good Samaritan. 20 The occasion
of the parable is a dialogue between Jesus and an expert in the
law, who agree that the law requires us to "[1] ove the Lord your
God with all your heart and with all your soul and with all your
strength and with all your mind," and to "[1]ove your neighbor
as yourself."21 The expert, however, "wanted to justify himself,"
and asks Jesus "And who is my neighbor?" 22 In response, Jesus
tells a story of a man who is left "half-dead" by robbers. 2' Two
significant religious leaders-a priest and a Levite-see the man
along the road, but "passed by on the other side."24 A Samaritan
traveling the road sees the man, takes pity on him, and rescues
him. The Samaritan treats the man's wounds and takes him to
an inn, leaving sufficient funds for his care until his return.25
After telling the story, Jesus asks the expert in the law to identify
the one who was a neighbor to the victimized man. "The one
who had mercy on him," correctly answers the expert in the law.
"Go and do likewise" responds Jesus.26
The relational dynamic between Jesus, the expert in the law,
and the characters in the story, underscores the meaning of the
parable. The expert in the law, like the priest and Levite of
Jesus' story, would have possessed a religiously based disdain for
the Samaritan. Yet, Jesus creates a story in which the Samaritan
fulfills the obligation of the law by acting as a neighbor to the
19. GUSHEE, supra note 1, 132-36 (1994); Exodus 20:13; see Eliash, supra note 1, at
622-23 (quoting Maimonides, describing undisputed Jewish teaching on bystander's
duty to rescue, and quoting Leviticus 19:16).
20. See Luke 10:25-37.
21. Luke 10:27 (New International Version).
22. Luke 10:29.
23. Luke 10:30.
24. Luke 10:31-32.
25. Luke 10:33-35.
26. Luke 10:36-37.
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victim, while the religious leaders fail to fulfill the obligations of
the law. Jesus subtly transforms the question "who is my neigh-
bor?" into the challenge that we act as neighbors to those who
require our assistance. It is not a question of us sitting in judge-
ment on who is worthy to be our neighbor, but rather of us be-
ing judged by whether we treat others as neighbors. Within
Jesus' narrative it is precisely a person who might be considered
unqualified to be a neighbor-the disdained Samaritan-who
proves himself a neighbor to the victim. Moreover, it is not
enough for someone, such as a priest, Levite, or expert in the
law, to teach correctly about the requirements of the law; in-
stead, the law of neighbor-love is kept by fulfilling its require-
ments through deeds of love. Hence, Jesus could challenge the
clever teacher of the law to imitate the Samaritan by performing
acts of compassion.
The Biblical narrative, interpreted in the context of the New
Testament, subtly reminds us of the dangers of knowing, but not
doing, the requirements of the law of love. The expert in the
law desires to justify himself by posing and answering clever
questions regarding the reach of the law. Jesus is unimpressed
by this display of self-justifying knowledge and righteousness, for
he senses the expert's pride and lack of love. It would appear
that the expert's correct knowledge of the law serves more to
condemn him than to justify him, for this true knowledge is used
to undergird pride rather than to aid love. Ironically, the expert
uses his correct knowledge of the law of love to justify himself,
and, apparently, to make himself feel superior to others, without
necessarily using this knowledge as a, spur toward actually per-
forming acts of love and mercy. The expert lacks the excuse of
ignorance of the requirements of the law, for he is an expert in
it; yet being an expert in the law of love has not necessarily
caused him to grow in the way of love, but instead may have had
the opposite effect.
As the apostle Paul warned the church in Corinth, "knowl-
edge puffs up, but love edifies."27 Even true knowledge of the
law can be misused to foster an attitude of superiority over
27. See I Corinthians 8:1 (New King James). The context of Paul's passage is a
debate within the church at Corinth regarding consumption of food sacrificed to idols.
Paul states that the idols are nothing, and hence that the eating or not eating of such
food is morally indifferent. Nonetheless, Paul insists that knowledge is subservient to
the demands of love, which may require abstinence to avoid leading astray the weaker
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others and self-justifying pride toward God. Rather than doing
justice, loving mercy, and walking humbly with God, as urged by
the Hebrew prophet Micah, 28 even experts in the law can use
their very knowledge of the law to obscure 'and evade the law's
requirements.
The application of this Biblical analysis to our present situa-
tion in regard to genocide, mass killings, and crimes against hu-
manity is painfully clear. Our generation has become expert in
regard to such atrocities. To a degree greater than any prior
generation, we proclaim the requirements of the law on such
matters. We endlessly analyze the atrocities of the past, placing
those from prior generations under a moral microscope. We
know that we have learned much, and that we are better than
our forebears. We pose difficult questions about the varied de-
grees of guilt of perpetrators, bystanders, witnesses, and even vic-
tims of past atrocities. Yet, when we encounter the victim along
the road, in Rwanda, or Cambodia, for example, we, like the
priest and Levite ofJesus' story, pass by on the other side. There
is, however, a new twist to the story. Rather than continuing on
our way, we return periodically to the site to watch as the victim
slowly dies. We do not simply turn away, but rather tune in for
updates. We sit by the side of the road, watching, but do not act
to save the victim from death. And then afterwards we justify
ourselves by using prosecutors, courts, and judges to continue
developing this law on which we have become so expert. And
this we call moral progress.
One of the primary Christian theological insights, then, is
that increased knowledge of the law does not necessarily bring
with it moral progress. Such knowledge of the law can produce
pride and a sense of superiority over others without actually in-
ducing conformity with the law. Other New Testament passages
emphasize that knowledge of the law can bring guilt and accom-
panying feelings of hopelessness and helplessness, as we realize
our moral limitations.29 This inner voice of self-condemnation
can be suppressed, however, by self-deception and self-censor-
ship, as we drown our guilt in hedonistic sensuality or nihilistic
Christians. See also 1 Corinthians 8. This theme of the superiority of love to knowledge
is further developed in the famous 13th chapter of Corinthians. 1 Corinthians 13:2.
28. See Micah 6:8.
29. See, e.g., Romans 7:7-24.
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philosophical speculation." In the end, knowing the law can
harden our hearts, unless we find a means of fulfilling it.
We are, this would suggest, in a dangerous situation with
regard to genocide, mass killings, and crimes against humanity.
Like law-abiding families living in a high-crime neighborhood,
we have become accustomed to primarily symbolic responses to
these offenses. In the meantime, genocide has become an ongo-
ing, apparently permanent part of our world. Our capacity to be
shocked by such things is necessarily diminishing over time, as
atrocities old and new have become an ongoing part of our con-
sciousness. Our knowledge of these horrors, past and present, is
used by us primarily to reassure ourselves of our righteousness
and superiority, rather than to spur us to compassionate action.
This normalization of such crimes has made us spectators and
analysts of inhumanity, passive viewers of the ongoing horror
show. And so even as we proclaim our own justification we hide
from ourselves the hardening of our hearts.
30. See Romans 1:18-32.
